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LIE DETECTOR TESTS: POSSIBLE ADMISSIBILITY
UPON STIPULATION
INTRODUCTION

The scene is a criminal case, the accused is in jail awaiting
trial on a charge of a serious felony.' The defendant urges his
innocence and in an effort to implement proof of his innocence
the defendant decides to take a polygraph 2 or lie detector test.
The test results indicate that the defendant is telling the
truth. At the trial, the defendant attempts to have the results
admitted, but the trial court, relying on appellate court precedent, refuses to admit them.3
On appeal, the court of review upholds the trial court's de1 Almost all of the appellate cases dealing with the admissibility of lie
detectors have been criminal cases. In the handful of civil cases on point,
the standards of admissibility seem to be the same as in criminal cases.
See Herman v. Eagle Star Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966);
California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1956); Gideon v. Gideon,
153 Cal. App. 2d 541, 314 P.2d 1011 (1957) ; Commissioner ex rel. Hunter
v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super 448, 169 A.2d 347 (1961) ; Fernandez v. SecurityFirst Nat'l Bank, 206 Cal. App. 2d 676, 24 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1962); State v.
Chang, 347 P.2d 5 (Hawaii 1962); Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d
172 (1951).
2 Keeler
named the polygraph which is short for pneumo-cardiosphygomal-vano-graph; contra; polygraph means "many pictures"; State v.
Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). For a physical description of the
INBAU & J. REID, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 3-8 (3d ed. 1953); Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L.

polygraph see F.

REV. 743, 748-57 (1952) ; Hensley, The Lie Detector in Action, 2 TEX. B.J. 482
(1940) ; Keeler, Debunking the Lie Detector, 25 J. CRIM. L. 153, 156 (1934).
For a brief discussion of questioning techniques see Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J.
694, 704 (1961); Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L. REV. 264, 265 (1946).
16 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 269 (1938):
There are three types of 'lie-detectors' used for detection of deception:
(a) The blood-pressure method originally proposed on the Continent,
has been developed in the United States principally by Martson, Larson
and Keeler . . . . The instrument merely records the reactions in a
subject's blood pressure and respiration when asked questions pertinent
to the ... investigation....
(b) The respiration method measures and records the time of respiration between question and answer, and the interpretation detects a lie.
This method has not been developed as an independent one, and is now
usually combined with the blood-pressure method.
(c)
The galvanometer method measures the variation in resistance of
the skin to electric-currents administered during emotional disturbances,
the variations being attributable due to changes in the activity of the
sweat glands ....
3 The exact antithesis of this situation is where the judge not only would
allow the results of the test admitted but instructs the parties to take the
test. See People v. Nimmer, 25 Ill. 2d 319, 185 N.E.2d 249 (1962); Stone
v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951). In Illinois there is a statutory prohibition against such action on the part of a trial judge in civil
cases, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §54.1 (1967), which forbids the judge to
require or request such a test- and in criminal cases, ILL. REv. STAT. ch.

38, §158-1 (1967), which forbids the trial judge to require, request or even
suggest such a test.
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cision that lie detector test results are properly excludable on the
theory that they are unreliable and lack general acceptance in
4
the scientific community.
4Unreliability and lack of general scientific acceptance are not the only
objections to the admission of lie detectors. Other objections raised by commentators and the courts include:
(A) Violation of a constitutional privilege (U.S. CONST. amend. V,
ILL. CONST., art. II, §10) against self incrimination - Skolnick,
Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An analysis of Lie
Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 725 (1961) ; People v. Simms, 395
Ill. 69, 69 N.E.2d 336 (1946); Hardman, Lie Detectors: Extra
Judicial Investigation and the Courts, 48 W.Va. L.Q. 37, 39
(1941); McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence,
15 CALIF. L. REV. 484, 502 (1927) ; People v. Schiers, 160 Cal. App.
2d 364, 324 P.2d 981 (1958) ; contra, Inbau, Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases, 24 J. CRIM. L. 1140, 1151 (1933); but cf.
People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
(B) The validity of the test results rely too much on the skill of the
operator - People v. Zazzetta, 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260
(1963); State v. Gregoire, 148 A.2d 751 (R.I. 1959); People v.
Aragon, 15 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957); People v.
Davis, 343 Mich. 348 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955) ; accord, Skolnick,
Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie
Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 704 (1961) ; Wicker, The Polygraph
Truth Test, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711-12 (1953).
(C)
The admission of such evidence would impair the vital function of
cross-examination - State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d
169; United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495
(1951); Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949);
State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) ; contra,
Belli & Streeter, The Fourth Degree: The Lie Detector, 5 VAND.
L. REV. 549 (1953).
Lie detectors are not effective on the psychologically abnormal
(D)
subject - Heckel, Brokaw, Salzberg & Wiggins, Polygraphic
Variations In Reactivity Between Delusional, Non-DelusionalAnd
Control Groups In A "Crime" Situation, 53 J. GRIM. L.C. & P.S.
380 (1962) ; Skolnick, Scientific Theory And Scientific Evidence:
An Analysis Of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694 715 (1961);
United States v. Stromberg, 179 F. Supp. 278 (S.b.N.Y. 1959);
People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955) ; Henderson
v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951) ; Boeche v. State,
151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); F. INBAU, LIE DETECTORS
AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 30 (2d ed. 1948) ; State v. Lowry,

(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)

(I)

163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947); Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26
B.U.L. REV. 264, 269 (1946); Trovillo, What the Lie Detector
Can't Do, 32 J. CRIM. L. 121 (1941).
The use of lie detectors would lead to the abolition of the jury Forkosch, The Lie Detector And The Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
202, 221 (1939); contra, Note, CORNELL L.Q. 535, 542 (1944).
Lie detector evidence with its many ramifications and variables
imposes too subtle a task of evaluation upon an untrained jury Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).
Lie detectors would merely distract the jury - State v. Foye,
254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961) ; State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181,
188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
Lie detector test results are not susceptible to cross-examination
- State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) ; Boeche v.
State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949); contra Belli &
Streeter, The Fourth Degree: The Lie Detector, 5 VAND. L. REV.
549 (1953).
Admitting such test results would permit the defendant to conduct
extra judicial tests without the necessity of submitting to similar
tests by the prosecution - State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120
S.E.2d 169 (1961); Stockwell v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 656, 301
S.W.2d 669 (1957); Peterson v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 255, 247
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The purpose of this comment is to present an analysis of
the principal cases which have followed or deviated from this
5
theory of exclusion.

(J)

(K)
(L)

(M)

(N)

S.W.2d 110 (1951); State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W.
314 (1933).
There isa lack of standardization of test procedure - Koeffler,
The Lie Detector - A Critical Appraisal of the Technique as a
Potential Undermining Factor in the Judicial Process, 3 N.Y.L.F.
123 (1957) ; Burack, A Critical Analysis of the Theory, Method,
and Limitations of the "Lie Detector," 46 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S.
414 (1955).
Lie detector results should not be allowable on both due process
and moral grounds - Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in
Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REV. 683, 687-89 (1956).
Lie detector results are influenced by interpretive bias (psychology
of the examiner) - Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie-Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 712
(1961).
There is a tendency of judges and juries to treat lie detectors as
conclusive evidence of defendant's guilt - State v. Valdez,
91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); Highleyman, The Deceptive
Certainty of the "Lie Detector," 10 HASTINGS L. REV. 47 (1958)
Kleinfeld, The Detection of Deception - A Resume, 8 FED. B.J.
153 (1947) ; accord, People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 307 N.Y.S.2d
430, 255 N.E.2d 696 (1969).
An objection not often raised by the courts, but one which perhaps
underlies those listed above, is that the courts are afraid of the
inherently prejudicial nature of lie detectors, People v. Leone,
25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696 (1969). Hence, while there is no
question that lie detector results are relevant, there is a latent fear
that once a jury is presented with the results of a lie detector
test they will be unable to decide the case on the total of the merits.
In other words, lie detector results would just be too prejudicial,
notwithstanding their admitted probative value; "any relevant
conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
Particularly, its probative value may be overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudice[e] ......

§363 (1954). Trautman suggests
that there can only be five reasons for excluding logically relevant
evidence (time consumption, confusion of the jury, prejudice,
surprise, embarrassment of the litigants or the public). The only
one of these which would appear to apply to the exclusion of lie
detectors is prejudice. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 397 (1952) (emphasis
added). C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §170 (1954).
5The reason that lie detector tests have not gained acceptance into the
courts appears to be one of legal theory and not lack of proof of the underlying scientific theory. Thus, quoting accuracy figures to the courts would
not appear to solve the problem. See, e.g., Henderson v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P.2d 495 (1951); State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483,
171 A.2d 124 (1961); contra, People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d
348 (County Ct., Queens County 1938).
For those wishing to cite accuracy figures the sources appear to be nearly
inexhaustible. A partial list could include: F. INBAU & J. REID, TRUTH AND
DECEPTION 110-11 (1966) ; Arther, The Lie Detector - Is It of Any Value?,
24 FED. PROBATION 36 (1960); Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22
TENN. L. REV. 743, 758 (1953); Inbau, The Lie-Detector, 26 B.U.L. REV.
264, 268 (1946); Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FODHAM L.
(0)

C. McCORMIcK, LAW OF EVIDENCE

REV. 334, 338 (1939); Note, 16 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 269 (1938); Marston,

Psychological Possibilities in the Deception Test, 11 J. CRIM. L. 551, 568
(1921).
An attorney wishing to gain acceptance for the lie detectors strictly on
the basis of statistical studies of their accuracy must be prepared to rebut
arguments that lie detector accuracy figures are tenuous at best; see F.
INBAU & J. REID, TRUTH AND DECEPTION 234 (1966); Burkey, The Case
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CASES WITHOUT STIPULATION

Frye v. United States,6 the first reported case to deal with the

admissibility of lie detector test results, propagated the doctrine
that such results are not admissible because they lack general
acceptance in the scientific community., The court explained:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force
of the principle must be recognized, and while many courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.

We

think the systolic blood pressure test has not gained such standing
and scientific recognition as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and
experiments thus far made."
Frye then, indicates that lie detector tests would not be admissible until lie detectors had general scientific acceptance. General scientific acceptance would appear to be the criterion demanded by the court before it takes judicial notice. But the
mere admission of scientific evidence would not seem to demand
general acceptance.9 Other types of scientific evidence are not
Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855-56 (1965); Skolnick, Scientific
Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J.
694, 699 (1961).

6293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ; Notes, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1138 (1924)
33 YALE L.J. 771 (1924) ; 24 COLUM. L. REV. 429 (1924). For an excellent
discussion of all lie detector cases from Frye through 1951 see Wicker,
The Polygraphic Truth Tests and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV.
711, 715-23 (1953).
7 This proposition raises a question as to just what scientific community
must recognize the efficacy of the lie detector. If medical devices are to be
judged by the medical community could it not be argued that criminal investigation apparatus need only be judged by that professional community?
Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1960)
suggests that expert testimony may be admissible when it has gained scientific acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs; cf, Skolnick,
Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70
YALE L.J. 694, 703 (1961).
8293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
Perhaps the court's decision
was correct on its facts as the lie detector used in that case was far less
sophisticated than those used today. Note, 46 IOWA L. REv. 651 (1961).
For a description of the machine used, see Martson, Psychological Possibilities in the Deception Tests, 11 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 551-54 (1921). Advocates
of the lie detector are fond of showing that if the test results would have
been admitted they would have tended to prove Frye's innocence. Without
the admission of the test results he was convicted, but another person later
confessed to committing the crime, see 14th ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL 265 (1948).
9 Lickfett v. Jorgenson, 179 Minn. 321, 229 N.W. 138 (1930); C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §170 (1954) suggests: "General scientific acceptance is a proper condition upon the courts taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence."
Cf. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2567 (3d ed. 1940) ; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§663 (3d ed. 1940) ; but cf. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence, 1970 ILL. L.F. 9-11.
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excluded because there is a lack of unanimity among the scientific community as to their accuracy and efficacy. 10
Instead, the scientific expert in other areas is allowed to
testify, and any disagreement among the scientific community
effects the weight afforded the evidence by the trier of the facts
and not its admissibility." The standard for the admission of
other types of scientific evidence is merely that it be accepted by
those expected to be familiar with its use 12 and that the apparatus
have a reasonable measure of precision."3 Frye, however, demanded nothing less than general acceptance among the scientific
14
community.
Even if the general acceptance theory of Frye were taken as
correct, those who advocate its use might urge that the lie detector is generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore its results should be admitted. 15
In this case, counsel for Frye not only urged the admission
of the test results conducted out of the court room but also made
an offering to conduct a test in the presence of the jury. Even
those legal scholars who would urge the admission of lie detector
test results under the proper conditions would not advocate conducting a lie detector test in the presence of the jury.' 6 Thus the
10 People v. Bobezyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951); McKay
v. State, '235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1951); Hardman Lie Detectors:
Extrajudicial Investigations and the Courts, 48 W. VA. L.Q. 37-8 (1941);
McCormick would suggest that judicial notice can be given even if scientists
do not agree; C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §325 (1954); see Abilene v.
Hall, 202 Kan. 636, 451 P.2d 188 (1969); Commonwealth v. Mummert, 183
Pa. Super. 638, 133 A.2d 301 (1957); United States v. U.S.C.M.A. 183
(1967).
" State v. Olwas 77 Ariz. 118, 267 P.2d 893 (1963); People v. Williams,
6 N.Y.2d 18, 159 N.E.2d 549 (1959); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504,
99 N.E.2d 567 (1951); McKay v. State, 235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App.
1950); contra, People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949). In
Bobezyk and McKay the state sought to admit results of the Harger drunkometer over the defendant's objection that there wasn't complete unanimity
in the scientific community. But cf., the court in State v. Lowry, 163 Kan.
622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947) felt that the analogy between lie detector admissibility and the admissibility of other types of scientific evidence is invalid
because the lie detector relies upon psychological data while other types of
scientific apparatus record physical data.
12People
v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958).
Perhaps this is the same way of saying that the device need only be generally
accepted by the professional community in which it is used. This is far
less demanding than general acceptance by the scientific community.
13 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §990 (3d ed. 1940).
14

293 F. at 1014.

15 McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence, 15 CALIF. L.
REV. 484 (1927); cf. Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of
It should also be noted
Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 723-25 (1953).
that, "[tihe machine used in Frye recorded only discontinuous systolic blood
pressure. This method has been found inadequate and a machine has been
developed which takes continuous readings of pulse rate, pressure, respiration
and perspiration." Comment, 46 IOWA L.R. 651 (1961).
16 C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §174 (1935); Comment, CORNELL
L.Q. 535, 542 (1944) ; McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of Evidence,
15 CALIF. L. REV. 484, 501 (1927) ; cf. State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d
43 (1945).
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rejection of the offering to have the test conducted before the
jury would appear to be accepted by the commentators as cor17
rect.
While there appear to be some tenable arguments against
the correctness of Frye, its effect was to prove false Dean Wigmore's prediction, "If there ever is devised a psychological test
for the evaluation of witnesses, the law will run to meet it."'
But, just as the holding in Frye proved Wigmore's prediction unwarranted, so did the subsequent case law.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin was next to consider the
admissibility of lie detector test results in State v. Bohner.19 The
defendant offered the results of a test conducted by Professor
Keeler of Northwestern University. The trial court rejected the
offer.2 0 This decision, upheld on appeal, appears to rely exclusively on the rationale and precedent of Frye.21 The court noted
that the lie detector had not, in the ten years since Frye, passed
from "the experimental to the demonstrable stage.

'2 2

It can thus

be inferred that when the lie detector does reach the "demonstrable" stage, 23 it will be admitted.

A secondary reason for this decision was the fact that the
test had been unilaterally conducted by the defendant in Bohner.24 The court indicated this was unfair since the state had
no opportunity to conduct a similar examination. 25 This objection can apparently be cured by simply having both parties agree
to participate in the administration of the test.
When originally decided, the language of Bohner seemed to
suggest that the Wisconsin courts would consider the admissibility of lie detector test results in the future (1) when they
17 It is said that the drama and tension of the courtroom coupled with
the psychological strain of submitting to a lie detector test would cause the
results to be erratic and inaccurate. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE
§174 (1935); see State v. Foye, 254 N.C. 704, 120 S.E.2d 169 (1961);
State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945) ; these courts felt that
conducting a lie detector test in the presence of a jury would merely distract
the jury. QUERY: Does it distract a jury any time an in court demonstration is performed, although to a lesser degree? Is then it merely a matter
of degree?
18 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §875 (2d ed. 1923).
19 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933); Notes, 13 B.U.L. REV. 321
(1933) ; 8 Wis. L. REv. 283 (1933) ; 24 J. CraM. L. 440 (1933).
20 210 Wis. at 657, 246 N.W. at 317.
21 Id. at 657-58, 246 N.W. at 317.
22 Id. at 658, 246 N.W. at 317.
23 But nowhere does the court explain what is meant by "demonstrable
stage." Subsequent case law has not picked up this phrase as a basis for
their decisions.
24210 Wis. at 659, 246 N.W. at 318.
25 Id. at 659, 246 N.W. at 318. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §990 (3d ed.
1940) suggests that if an experiment is conducted out of court, basic fairness
demands that any opponents be given an opportunity to be present and observe the testing technique and the results. Perhaps having the opposing
party represented would also put to test doubts as to the validity and fairness of the tests.
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pass into the demonstrable stage, and (2) where the tests are
conducted by both parties.2 6 However, later Wisconsin cases
have proved any such interpretation of this case to be unwar2 7
ranted.
While both Bohner and Frye rejected the admission of lie
detector tests, a New York court in People v. Kenny 28 admitted
29
the results of a pathometer test.
After the proper foundation had been laid, Professor Summers of Fordham University testified that he had achieved 100
percent accuracy in the 6,000 tests he had conducted3 ° The trial
court was so impressed with this testimony that the lie detector
tests were admitted even though the court was made aware of
the decisions in Frye and Bohner.
The Kenny court indicated that the time had come to recognize the lie detector as a reliable judicial tool and said that lie

detector operators should be allowed to testify even if they might
disagree with one another in their conclusions.2 1 Any disagreement, the court said, should go to the weight afforded the evidence and not to its admissibility. 2 Thus, while Frye and Bohner
refused to admit lie detectors because they lacked general acceptance in the scientific community, Kenny admitted the pathometer
results not only because the court felt that the lie detector had
gained scientific acceptance, but because the court felt that gen-'
eral scientific acceptance was not a prerequisite to admissibility.
Thus the court took the position commonly held regarding other
26 Id.
27
28

See LeFevre v. State, 242 Wis. 410, 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943).

167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (County Ct. Queens County 1938) ; Note,

16 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 269 (1938).
29 The device used here was different from that used in Frye and Bohner.
For a detailed description see 24 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 442 (1933) ; Forkosch,
The Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 202, 208 (1939);
Summers, Science Can Get the Confession, 8 FORDHAM L. REV. 334 (1939).
The pathometer measures the changes in the electrical conductivity of the
skin in response to emotional stimuli, Note, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535, 537 (1944).
30 The decision in the Kenny case has been criticized as being factually
incorrect and historically untenable; State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d
508 (1950); accord, F. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
84 (2d ed. 1948).
31 167 Misc. at 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 351; Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368,
37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (Chappel, J., concurring) where it was noted that
the deductions of psychiatrists and handwriting experts are not uniform, yet
their testimony is received by the court into evidence, the question becoming
one of weight to be accorded the evidence by the jury. QUERY: If expert
witnesses were always in agreement would there be any point for the defendant to call an expert after the plaintiff had put on his case utilizing
expert witnesses?
32 Id. at 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 351; accord, People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App.
504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951) ; McKay v. State, 235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App.
1951) ; cf. Brett v. Carras, 230 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1953), where the court said
that expert testimony did not have to amount to dogma to be admitted and
if expert witnesses are willing to estimate probabilities, then it is error for
the judge to exclude the evidence.
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demonstrative evidence, i.e., that disagreement as to its relia-

bility should go to its weight not its admissibility.23
However, People v. Forte,34 which was a New York case
arising in a district different from Kenny, refused to follow
Kenny and would not admit the results of a pathometer test.
The Forte decision was based upon two grounds: (1) a statement made by Dean Wigmore, 35 (2) the precedent and reasoning
of Frye.
The court said:
We cannot take judicial notice that this instrument is or is not
effective for the purpose of determining the truth. . . . The
record is devoid of evidence tending to show a general scientific
recognition that the pathometer possesses efficacy. 6
The Forte court required a greater standard for the admissibility of lie detector results than even the Frye and Bohner
courts by demanding that judicial notice be taken- 7 before the
results would be admitted.
Forte was appealed and affirmed while Kenny was but a
trial court decision which was never appealed because the defendant prevailed. It was thus assumed that Forte overruled
Kenny sub silentio3s However, close analysis of the cases shows
that in Kenny a proper foundation for the introduction of the
test results was laid. 9 But in Forte, there was no such foundation as to the efficacy of the lie detector. Hence, it is argued that
the cases were entirely reconcilable, the difference in result being
due to a lack of foundation in Forte.40
33 167
34279

Misc. at 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938); Notes, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 434
(1939); 37 MICH. L. REV. 1141 (1939) ; 25 VA. L. REV. 492 (1939) ; 27 ILL.
B.J. 308 (1939).
35 J.
WIGMORE
SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF §311-B (3d ed. 1937).
Wigmore apparentfy favored the qualified use of lie detectors however; 29
CORNELL L.Q. 535-36 (1944).
3( 279 N.Y. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.

37
An occasional decision is to be found suggesting that unless
judicial notice will be taken of the general scientific proposition or propositions necessary to interpret the significance of offered specific data,
the line of proof is inadmissible. This suggestion is clearly contrary to
the overwhelming weight of authority on the subject, and reflects an erroneous view of the function of judicial notice in this area.
Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L.F. 9. The result of Forte seems to contradict Wigmore's view that
a scientist should be allowed to testify if the scientific process has a reasona-

ble measure of precision. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §990 (3d ed. 1940).
38 People v. Hill, 64 Ill. App. 2d 185, 212 N.E.2d 259 (1965) ; State v.

Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
39 167 Misc. at 52-53, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 349-50.
40 Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ; (Chappel, J.,
concurring) ; Note, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535, 537 (1944) ; but see People ex rel.
Blackmon v. Brent, 97 Ill. App. 2d 438, 240 N.E.2d 255 (1968) where the
appellant was precluded from arguing on appeal that the appellee had failed
to lay a proper foundation for the admission of lie detector tests because
the appellant had failed to object to the proffer at the trial. Hence, the lie
detector test results were allowed to stand on appeal.
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For a number of years, supporters of Kenny argued that in

New York, at least, it was a matter of the trial court's discretion
as to whether lie detector test results should be admitted, as
Forte had not overruled Kenny. Whatever the merit of this
argument, the question appears to now be settled in New York

as a consequence of People v. Leone.41 The court, in a comprehensive opinion, quoted with favor from Forte in excluding lie
42
detector results.

There has been no decision aside from Kenny which has
seriously deviated from Frye. The impact of Kenny on later

opinions has been small due to the fact that it was a trial court
opinion and its precedent value was attenuated by Forte. Frye

has continued to be followed in principle, but some decisions have
held lie detector results inadmissible because there was no testi43
mony offered to qualify either the technique or the operator.
Such a case was People v. Becker. 4 The court, recognizing
the general rule of exclusion, rejected the defendant's offer to
admit the results of a lie detector test.4 5 However, another reason for the court disallowing the results was that the defense
attorney offered no testimony to prove the efficacy of the test.4
Cases like this suggest that the proper foundation must be laid
25 N.Y.2d 511, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 255 N.E.2d 696 (1969).
Id. at 513-14, 255 N.E.2d at 699-700. The New York court could
have "cleared the deck" because of the Kenny-Forte dichotomy and looked
to an entirely different standard, to wit, if the device is felt to have sufficient
probative value its results should be admitted. Hadley v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R., 120 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1941); Bororad v. Kosberg, 8 A.2d 342 (D.C.
Cir. 1951); Haile v. Dinnis, 184 Md. 144, 40 A.2d 363 (1944); Godsy v.
Thompson, 352 Mo. 681, 179 S.W.2d 44 (1944) ; Trook v. Sagert, 171 Ore.
680, 138 P.2d 900 (1943). X-rays are admissible where they tend to aid the
jury to understand the plaintiff's condition, Killilay v. Hawk, 250 Ill. App.
222 (1928). Commentators would appear to favor, such a view, Trautman,
Logical or Legal Relevancy - A Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385,
395 (1952) : "If the test results are shown by scientific experience to render
the inferences of consciousness of falsity or truth substantially more probable, then the courts should accept the evidence though the possibility of error
in the inference be recognized." McCormick, Deception Tests and the Law of
Evidence, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 484 (1927). Contra, Skolnick, Scientific Theory
and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694,
726 (1961) ; Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 75 (1871) : "The proper test for
the admissibility of evidence . . . [is] whether it has a tendency to affect
belief in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, who should weigh it with
judicial fairness."
43 Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1957); Boeche v.
State, 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) (Chappell, J., concurring); cf.
Parker v. Friendt, 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N.E.2d 216 (1954). Other courts
have emphasized the absence of a stipulation; State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J.
Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961); People v. Aragon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646,
316 P.2d 370 (1957); Commonwealth v. McKinley, 181 Pa. Super. 610, 123
A.2d 735 (1956) ; State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
44 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
45 Id. at 565, 2 N.W.2d at 504.
46Id. at 566, 2 N.W.2d at 505. In another Michigan case People v.
Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955), the court excluded lie detector
test results on the same grounds even after noting that the witness was an
eminently qualified and world renowned scientist, lawyer and doctor.
41

42
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before a court will even consider lie detector test results, but
leave open the question of whether the evidence of the efficacy
47
must satisfy the Frye, Kenny or Forte requirements.
In 1949, one year after lie detector test results were first
admitted in People v. Houser,48 upon stipulation of the parties,
there first appeared to be some softening of judicial opposition to
the lie detector. This manifested itself in the concurring opinion
in Boeche v. State.49 In that case, after an exhaustive summary
of the reported cases, the concurring opinion held that no foundation had been laid in this case, hence the results were properly
excluded. °
The concurring opinion noted:
However, I am convinced that if such a foundation were laid, as
was done in People v. Kenny... then the testimony of the operator
and the results obtained by the tests would be admissible in criminal cases, such as that at bar, wherein defendant had voluntarily
submitted to the tests.5 1
This is the only appellate court opinion advocating that if
the proper foundation is laid, the admission of lie detector test
results without any limitation is proper.52 Because the foundation in Kenny was cited with approval, 53 it may be assumed that
the judicial notice standard of Frye and the general acceptance
standard of Frye was being repudiated. No appellate cases have
been found which have followed the concurring opinion in Boeche,
however.
CASES INVOLVING STIPULATIONS

As the Kenny decision indicates, lie detector test results
have been admitted at the trial level in some instances. However,
unlike Kenny, most of the trial level cases have involved stipula5 4
tions by the parties.
One noted authority indicated that test results should be
admitted only when a stipulation exists. 5 One of the reasons
47 That is, whether the scientific accuracy must be such that the court
can take judicial notice (Forte); the device must have gained general acceptance (Frye) ; or that it should be admitted and any disagreement goes
to weight, not admissibility (Kenny).
48 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
49 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949) ; in the seven years between
Becker and Boeche the only reported case appears to be State v. Cole, 354
Mo. 181, 188 S.W.2d 43 (1945).
50 Id. at 384, 37 N.W.2d at 600.

51 Id. at 383, 37 N.W.2d at 600.
52 It should be remembered that Kenny was but a published trial court
decision.

151 Neb. 381, 37 N.W.2d 593, 599 (1949).
54 Note, 1943 Wis. L. REV. 430; Inbau, Detection of Deception Technique
Admitted as Evidence, 26 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 262 (1935). One commentator
suggests that the courts are using the stipulation as a vehicle to admit lie
detector tests, 15 ALA. L. REv. 248 255 (1963).
'5 Inbau, The Lie Detector, 2d B.U.L. Rav. 264; 20 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
173, 177 (1963). It should be noted that there is a distinction between agree53
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given in support of this idea is that if the parties agree as to the

identity of the operator, this in itself is an additional safeguard
that the operator is competent. 56 Another reason given is that
a party should not be allowed to urge unreliability on appeal
because if he stipulates that a course of action should be taken
at the trial court level; he should not be heard to complain be57
cause the court acted upon the stipulation.
LeFevre v. State5 8 was the first appellate case to deal directly

with the admissibility of lie detector test results where there
existed a signed stipulation.

The defendant, accused of murder,

agreed to take a lie detector test conducted by Professor Mathews
of the University of Wisconsin. A stipulation was entered into
by the state and the defendant.5 9 The defendant passed the test

but the state wanted further tests conducted. These tests were
conducted under the direction of Professor Keeler, 6° and there
was a similar stipulation with similar results. The defendant
did not offer to have either Keeler or Mathews testify but offered
only the test results. At the trial the state objected to the

61
admission of the results. The trial court excluded the evidence
but the district attorney, who had objected to the proffer for some
unexplained reason, said in rebuttal that the results were favora-

ble to the defendant.

Hence, while the results were not admis-

sible by the defendant, the fact that they indicated that the
defendant was telling the truth was admitted, the defendant making no objection. The trial court's decision was upheld on
appeal, the court relying exclusively on Bohner,62 even though
Bohner did not contain a stipulation and one of the bases for the
decision was that the tests had been unilaterally conducted
while here the tests were not only bilaterally conducted but it
ing to take a lie detector test and agreeing to have those results admitted into

evidence, State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961).
5
6 Note 20 S. CAL. L. REV. 804, 814 (1968).

5,People v. Lehman, 5 Ill. 2d 337, 125 N.E.2d 506 (1955); People v.
Anderson, 239 Ill. 168, 87 N.E. 917 (1909) ; evidence stipulated to will not
be questioned by the supreme court; People v. LaBostru, 14 Ill. 2d 617, 153
N.E.2d 570 (1958) ; People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608, 57 N.E.2d 345 (1944).
5 242 Wis* 416 8 N.W.2d 288 (1943); Note, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 430.
59 Id. at 424, 8 N4.W.2d at 292:
It is further stipulated and agreed by and between the said Frank
LeFevre and S. Richard Heath that any fact, matter or thing disclosed
by said lie detector examination of said Frank LeFevre and the findings
of Professor Mathews thereon, may be admitted in any trial or preliminary examination before any of the courts of the county of Fond du Lac
or state of Wisconsin.
60 Keeler is an early associate of Fred Inbau who distinguished himself
as a teacher and improvisor. Many of the improvements Keeler made to
early polygraphs are still used today. For a discussion of some of Keeler's
contributions, see Trovillo, A History of Lie Detection, 29 AM. J. P. S. 848,
877-82 (1939).
61 However, Wigmore states that a party may stipulate as to what a
witness would say if he were present. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2595 (3d
ed. 1940).
62 For a discussion, see text at note 19 supra.
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was stipulated that the results would be admitted. The court
did not disqualify the stipulation nor mention it nor did it distinguish Bohner.
Legal scholars have attempted to justify that decision on
one of two grounds. The first is that because the testimony of the
operators was not offered, the results were properly excluded
under the hearsay ruleo6 because neither expert was called to
testify and only the reports of the experts were sought to be
admitted. But, there seems to be no reason why the parties to
a lawsuit cannot stipulate to the suspension of a rule of evidence. 64 Nevertheless, this indicates that whatever effect a
stipulation might have in other areas, in lie detector cases the
65
operator must be called to testify.
Another justification offered is that because the district
attorney testified that the results were favorable, the defendant
obtained all the benefit he would have obtained had the results
been admitted. 6
Notwithstanding these attempts at justification, this decision would not appear to be followed in the jurisdictions which have considered this question.
In State v. Lowry, 6 at the Kansas court's suggestion, the
defendant and the complaining witness agreed to take a Keeler
Polygraph Test.6 8 On appeal, the test results were disallowed
even though a foundation was laid and the operator was called
to testify.6
The appellate court went to great pains to note
that there existed no stipulation that the test results should be
admitted. The court quoted with favor a law review article
by Professor Inbaull predicting the admissibility of lie detector results if there existed a properly executed stipulation.
Thus the mere fact that both parties to an action voluntarily
submit to take a lie detector test does not mean that the court
6329 CORNELL L.Q. 535, 538 (1944).
But cf. "Whether by contract
before litigation arisen a party may provide for the non-enforcement of a

rule of Evidence, or for its waiver. . .

."

9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE at 593

§2592 (3d ed. 1940); Wright Lumber Co. v. Ripley Co., 270 Mo. 121, 192
S.W. 996 (1917).

9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2592 (3d ed. 1940).
65 Perhaps this is a manifestation of a fear that lie detector results if
64

admitted without any checks would in certain cases be extremely prejudicial.

How does this result square with People v. Pierce, 387 Ill. 608, 57 N.E.2d

345 (1944), where the court said the accused may by stipulation waive the
necessity of proof of any part of the case against him. But cf. People ex rel.
Blackmon v. Brent, 97 Ill. App. 2d 438, 240 N.E.2d 255 (1968) when the
operator was not called to testify yet the lie detector results were admitted
and upheld on appeal. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that the

appellant never complained at the trial level to the proffer.

66 C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §174, n. 6 (1954).
This appears, however,
to be but an application of the old saw "The end justifies the means."
67 163 Kan. 622, 185 P.2d 147 (1947).
66 The Keeler Polygraph is described at note 2 supra.
69 163 Kan. at 625-27, 185 P.2d at 149-50.
70 Inbau, The Lie Detector, 26 B.U.L. REV. 264, 271 (1946) ; the court
also cited to 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535 (1944).
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will treat this submission with the same respect it will afford a
written stipulation.'
Indeed, it would appear that there must
be a written stipulation signed by all parties and their attorneys.
The court strengthened any arguments for future admissibility
of the lie detector by noting success in out of court uses.7 2 This
was the first appellate decision speaking for a majority,73 to
indicate that lie detector test results could be admitted under
the proper circumstances. More specifically, this court indicated that, had the state and the defendant entered into a stipulation as to the admission of the test results, they might have
been admitted.
In People v. HouserJ," lie detector test results were admitted
where there existed a signed, written stipulation.75 The stipulation provided that the test results might be used by either the
defendant or the state. The results proved to be unfavorable
to the defendant. The state after laying the proper foundation 8
introduced the test results.
71 Several cases have emphasized the absence of a stipulation, including:
State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 171 A.2d 124 (1961); People v. Ara-

gon, 154 Cal. App. 2d 646, 316 P.2d 370 (1957); Commonwealth v. McKinley,
181 Pa. Super. 610, 123 A.2d 735 (1956) ; State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185
P.2d 147 (1947).
In Arnwine, the court specifically noted that there is a
difference between agreeing to take a test [and make the results available to
other parties] and agreeing to have the results admitted into evidence.
72 However, even for extra judicial purposes the lie detector has been
met with less than boundless enthusiasm. In 1965 there were six states
which forbid the imposition of polygraph tests as a condition of employment,
Burkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855-56 (1965);
labor arbitrators have held that employees need not submit to lie detector
tests, Dayton Steel Foundry, 39 Lab. Arb. 745 (1962); Wilkof Steel Supply
Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 883 (1962), 13 DEPAUL L. REv. 287 (1964). Labor does not
like lie detectors because employers might fire an employee without other
evidence, Burkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855-56
(1965).
Some lawyers now give clients a lie detector test before taking a
case on a contingency basis, 30 MICH. ST. B.J. 12, 28 (1951) ; lie detectors
have found various industrial applications, Note 29, CORNELL L.Q. 535, 539-40
(1944).
73 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1938) was a trial court
report and was not the report of an appellate court case.
74 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948).
75 The stipulation provided in part:
...
the question propounded by said operator and the answers given by
said defendant and the recordings of said defendant's reactions thereto
and everything appertaining to said test and the entire results of said
tests including the opinions of said operator be received in evidence
either on behalf of the people or on behalf of the defendant . . . and
that said defendant hereby waives his constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination to the extent that the same may be involved in the
presentation in evidence of the foregoing matters.
Id. at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
76
The machine was displayed to the jury and its mechanism and the
manner in which the test was given was explained and interpreted to
the jury. He explained that he asked the defendant a series of ten questions to be answered by 'yes' or 'no.' Some questions related to matters
immaterial to the charge and others were directly pertinent to it. The
graph was introduced in evidence. The expert concluded and stated that
he was of the opinion from the test given defendant that defendant
Houser was not telling the truth in respect to the accusations made.
Id. at 691, 193 P.2d at 940.
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The defendant on appeal urged the exclusionary doctrine of
Frye. The court, unlike the court in Bohner, held that the
stipulation made a difference and that such a stipulation would
be binding upon the parties. The court said:
It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted
on this appeal to take advantage of any claim that such operator
was not an expert and that as to the results of the test such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to indicate
that he was not telling the truth.

...

77

The opinion does not indicate that the defendant objected at
the trial level to the admission of this evidence. Apparently, the
first time defendant objected was on appeal. It is said that this
fact considerably weakens the decision7 8 because as a general
rule a fact not urged at the trial level cannot be raised on appeal."
This case did, then, allow lie detector test results to be admitted where there existed a written, signed stipulation. But,
the failure of the defendant to object to the offer at the trial level
attenuates the impact of this case.
Stone v. Earp,8 0 a Michigan case, was the first civil action
to deal with the admissibility of lie detector test results on
appeal. After the plaintiff and defendant had given conflicting
stories, the trial judge said he was not going to decide the
case until the parties submitted to a lie detector test. 81 Both
parties stipulated that the test results could be admitted.
On appeal, the court held that it was error 8 2 to admit the
results of the lie detector test. The court relied upon People
v. Beckere8 which held that the tests were still only experimental
and could not be approved for general use. 84 In neither Michigan
1785 Cal. App. 2d at 695, 193 P.2d at 942.
7815 ALA. L. REV. 248, 252 (1962).
7 "It is a rule of universal application that the reversal of a judgement
cannot be urged upon a ground not submitted to the trial court and upon
which it did not and was not asked to decide." People v. Brand, 415 I1. 329,
337 114 N.E.2d 370, 374 (1953). See also People ex rel. Blackmon v. Brent,
97 Ill. App. 2d 438, 240 N.E.2d 255 (1968) where lie detector test results
were admitted after the parties had executed a written stipulation. The
appellant objected to the admission of a carbon copy of the test results (the
original having been lost). The court held that an objection to evidence on a
specific ground constitutes a waiver to object on other grounds. It is noteworthy that in this case the operator was not called to testify and this was,
of course, urged as reversible error. But, the court felt the appellant was
precluded from raising the question, not having raised it at the trial level.
80 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W.2d 172 (1951).
81 The court held this was merely non reversible error as it appears that
even without the test results, the evidence was heavily in favor of defendant.
One commentator suggested that if the judge instructs the parties to take a
lie detector test, failure to comply is contemptuous, Note, 29 CORNELL L.Q.
535, 543-44 (1944).
82 331 Mich. at 610, 50 N.W.2d at 174.
83 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
84 The Michigan courts appear to be hesitant to give recognition to any
scientific evidence. For example in People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38
N.W.2d 322 (1949), the Michigan courts refused to admit the results of the
Harger drunkometer test. The Michigan view appears to be a minority one,
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case was there any attempt to lay a foundation as to the qualifications of the operator, the technique used, or as to the effectiveness of the machine. 85 While none of the courts have decided
the issue, it does not appear that the parties will be allowed to
stipulate away the foundation even though the right to object
on other grounds may be lost through stipulation.
The Stone court did not discuss the effect that the stipulation played in this decision. Indeed it would appear that the court
did not give the stipulation any consideration. The court further
indicated that for these purposes the standard of admissibility
would be the same for civil cases as for criminal cases.8 6 The
opinion conspicuously lacks any indication of an attempt by the
defendant to lay a foundation as to the reliability of the test
there used. Absent such a showing, this decision seems justified
in light of People v. Becker,8 as in that case the court felt that
the lie detector had not passed from the experimental stage. 8
Hence, there was no Michigan decision where the court had
recognized the efficacy of the lie detector. Even if there had
been a line of decisions admitting lie detector test results, it
would still seem only prudent to deal with it in each trial court as
though it were a case of first impression. This case should be
taken for the proposition that stipulations as to the admission
of lie detector test results will be given no effect as to the
foundation of the efficacy of the machine or the qualifications
of the operator.

In State v. McNamara,8 an Iowa case, a murder conviction
was upheld despite the introduction, by the state, of lie detector
test results. As in Houser,90 the defendant signed a stipulation
that the test results could be admitted by either party."
On
People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E.2d 567 (1951) ; McKay v. State,
235 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950).
85 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949); People v.
Becker, 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942); but in People v. Davis, 343
Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955), the Michigan court rejected lie detector
test results where the operator was shown to be qualified because lie detectors
had not gained general, scientific acceptance.
86 331 Mich. at 610, 50 N.W.2d at 174 (1951) ; contra, Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and the Law of Evidence, 22 TENN. L. REV. 711, 720
(1953).
87 300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W.2d 503 (1942).
88 Id. at 565-66, 2 N.W.2d at 505.
89 252 Iowa 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960) ; Note, 6 S.D.L. REV. 136 (1961).
90 See text at note 74 supra.
91
January 30, 1959 I, Darlene McNamara, do hereby voluntarily,
without duress, coercion, promise of reward or immunity, submit to examination by the polygraph (lie detector) detection of deception technique. The examiner may give his professional opinion as to the results
of said examination, to law enforcement and judicial officers and other
appropriate officials, and that said examiner may testify in a Court of
Law as to his opinion as to the results of said examination. Francis
J. Pruss, Phil Hoover, witnesses; s/ Darlene McNamara.
252 Iowa at 27, 104 N.W.2d at 573.
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appeal, the defendant urged the exclusionary rule despite the
stipulation. The court, however, followed Houser and held that
92
the defendant was bound by her stipulation.
Unlike the defendant in Houser, the defendant in McNamara
"strenuously objected" to any evidence regarding the tests on
the ground that they were "unreliable and prejudicial".9 3 This
then firmly established the fact that stipulated lie detector test
results would stand up on appeal even where the defendant
validly urged the question in the trial court.
94
In State v. Freeland,,
the Iowa Supreme Court, just four
years after McNamara, refused to extend the rule of that case to
unstipulated results. Indeed, the court held that the agreement
of both parties was necessary. 5 The supreme court also held
that the trial judge could not compel the state to furnish the
test.96 Thus it appears that even those jurisdictions which now
allow stipulated lie detector test results to be admitted still
follow the general rule of exclusion where no stipulation is
found to exist. This is a trap that unwary counsel may easily
fall into after a few cases have allowed admission upon stipulation. If he fails to execute a stipulation or executes a faulty
one9" he will find that the results are inadmissible.
In Freeland the state resisted the motion to compel the
administration of the test as not being presented in a timely
manner. From this it seems likely that the state will agree to
a stipulation only if the offer is made within a short time after
arrest. The court cannot and should not compel the parties
to take a lie detector test, nor can the court require a party
to stipulate to the admission of evidence of this nature. 8 As
a practical matter, it would appear that if timely notice is given
the state may be willing to administer the test and to stipulate as
to the result.
The New Mexico case of State v. Trimble99 is the only
recent case which invokes the exclusionary doctrine where the
parties executed a signed stipulation. The results were excluded
despite the presence of the stipulation and what would appear
92

1d. at 29, 104 N.W.2d at 574.
93 Id. at 28, 104 N.W.2d at 573.
94255 Iowa 1334, 125 N.W.2d 825 (1964).
95 Id. at 1339, 125 N.W.2d at 828.
96Note there is little trouble getting approval of the defendant
because if he wants the test administered there is no problem and if he does

not want it administered it is impossible to do it without his cooperation.

Contra, one commentator suggests that the trial judge should be able to
compel the parties to take a lie detector test [in the absence of a contrary
statute] and that failure to comply should result in contempt sanctions, Note
29 CORNELL L.Q. 535, 544 (1944).
97 See text at note 120 infra.
98 For the Illinois view, see note 3 supra.
99 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961).
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to be a properly laid foundation. 1 0 The case is apparently
distinguishable, however, because, while basing its reasoning on
LeFevre v. State,1°1 the court shows a conspicuous lack of
recognition of either Houser or McNamara.102 Hence, the court
may have thought that LeFevre was the only case to have dealt
with the subject. LeFevre did not give the stipulation any effect
nor did Trimble. Trimble would appear to be doubtful authority
for the proposition that lie detectors are properly excluded even
where there exists a valid stipulation.
The most enlightening decision involving the admissibility of
stipulated lie detector test results is the Arizona decision of
State v. Valdez.' °
The defendant, his counsel and the county
attorney entered into a written stipulation that the test results
would be admissible at the request of any party. At the trial,
the defendant objected to the admission of the results. Because

of the importance of the subject, the state trial court certified
0 4
the question to the supreme court.
The court, after a review of cases both with and without
stipulations, held that it would not admit lie detector test results
absent a stipulation. 0 5 The court indicated that it would admit
stipulated lie detector test results subject to the following limitations:
(1)
That the county attorney, defendant and his counsel all sign
a written stipulation providing for defendant's submission
to the test and for the subsequent admission at trial of the
graphs and the examiner's opinion thereon on behalf of
either defendant or the state.
(2)
That notwithstanding the stipulation the admissibility of
the test results is subject to the discretion of the trial judge,
i.e. if the trial judge is not convinced that the examiner
is qualified or that the test was conducted under proper
conditions he may refuse to accept such evidence.
100
Preliminarily, Hathaway testified that he had conducted approximately 3,000 polygraph tests and, of those found necessary to verify for
accuracy, approximately 100, none were found to be wrong. From there
the witness proceeded to fully explain to the jury the working of the
machine and how it was attached to the person of the defendant. The
witness further related to the jury a list of questions propounded by
him to the defendant concerning the alleged offense and his answers
thereto while undergoing the test. The witness then testified that the
reaction of the machine indicated that the defendant had given false
answers concerning his guilt, from which the witness concluded that the
defendant was guilty of the crime charged.
Id. at 406-07, 362 P.2d at 788.
10 See note 58 supra.
102 Cf. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962).
This perhaps emphasizes the importance of distinguishing for the trial court the
stipulation cases from those without a stipulation. It seems quite probable
that if the court is not made aware of this distinction it will not admit the
lie detector test under the authority of the Frye line of cases.
103 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); 5 ARIz. L. REv. 76 (1963); 20
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 173 (1963).
104 Id. at 276, 371 P.2d at 895.
105 Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
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(3)

(4)

That if the graphs and examiner's opinion are offered in
evidence the opposing party shall have the right to crossexamine the examiner respecting:
a. the examiner's qualifications and training;
b. The conditions under which the test was administered;
c. the limitations of and possibilities for error in the
technique of polygraphic interrogation; and
d. at the discretion of the trial judge, any other matter
deemed pertinent to the inquiry.
That if such evidence is admitted the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend
to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a
defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that
at the time of the examination defendant was not telling the
truth. Further, the jury members should be instructed that
is for them what corroborative weight and effect such testimony should be given. 106

The importance of these qualifications is that they are the
only definitive court-made limitations on how and under what
conditions stipulated lie detector results should be admitted. It

is most significant that even if these qualifications are met, the
trial judge still retains discretion as to whether the test results
should be admitted or excluded. 10
Herman v. Eagle Star Insurance Company0 8 involved a

fact situation where the plaintiff was suing the defendant insurance company for the value of some expensive jewelry insured by
the defendant. The plaintiff agreed to take a lie detector test and
it was stipulated'0 9 by the parties that the test results would be

admissible into evidence.
The federal district court, applying California law and the
rationale of Houser,1o admitted the lie detector test results. This
case, a civil action, completed the spectrum of possible cases
where lie detector results were stipulated to, and admitted. In
a civil case the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the
evidence, however slight.111 The burden of proof in a criminal
106 Id. at 283-84, 371 P.2d at 900-01.

107
It is generally accepted that the trial judge should exclude circumstantial evidence even though logically relevant, if its probative
value is 'out weighed' by the risk that the admission will . . .tend to
excite the emotions of the jury to the undue prejudice of the opponent.

H. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 392 (1952).
108 283 F. Supp. 33 (C.D. Cal. 1966).
... ";

A Conflict in Theory,

109 This case presented a fact question whether there was a validly
executed stipulation as the plaintiffs claimed incorrectness of the date of the
signature. The question certain to be argued often in the future can be
avoided by careful draftsmanship and the use of witnesses.
110 See text at note 74 supra.

III Abhau v. Grassie, 262 Ill. 636, 104 N.E. 1020 (1914); Vischer v.
Northwestern Elevated R.R., 256 Ill. 572, 100 N.E. 270 (1912); cf. C. McCORMICK, LAW Op EVIDENCE §319 (1954) suggests that it might be more
acceptable to speak in terms of preponderance of probability as to the existence of a contested act.
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case is "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 112 Frum this has been
suggested, somewhat questionably, that lie detector tests should
have an easier burden in civil than in criminal cases 18 in view
14
of the "general acceptance argument" as espoused in Frye.'
Perhaps, however, this view confuses the ultimate weighing
test 15 with the test of admissibility. However, this has not appeared to be the case where no stipulation exists and no such argument is needed when a stipulation exists.

The future of lie detectors does, however, appear to be
brighter in civil cases"" because there is less chance of constitutional or procedural problems. Possibility of admission is particularly bright where both parties agree to take the test and
stipulate that the results may be admitted. In such a case the
argument that lie detector results should be inadmissible seems
less viable because the possibility of error would seem to be
diminished." 7 This reduction of possible error, coupled with the
parties' stipulation, would seem to emasculate the application

of Frye to those cases, and in such a case the admission or exclusion of the lie detector should be a matter of trial court

discretion, not law.
Two of the principal cases dealing with the validity of

stipulations to admissibility of lie detector test results have
arisen in Illinois. Neither court was forced to decide the question of admissibility of lie detectors, as the stipulations were both
disqualified.
The first of the cases, People v. Zazzetta,"8 is cited for the
proposition that lie detector results are not admissible in Illinois. 1 9 However, this is incorrect, as the case stands for a
112 9 J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2497 (3d ed.
118 Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test
TENN. L. REV. 711, 720 (1953).
"4

1940).
and the Law of Evidence, 22

See text at note 6 supra.

It would be clearly erroneous to assume that because the burden of
proof were different that the rules of evidence would be different in civil and
criminal cases. Indeed, no opinions can be found which even suggest such
a rule.
16 Contra,other civil cases where lie detector results have been excluded
include: California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Gideon v.
Gideon, 150 Cal. App. 2d 541, 314 P.2d 1011 (1957); Commonwealth ex rel.
Hunter v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 448, 169 A.2d 347 (1961) ; Fernandez v.
Security-First Nat'l Bank, 206 Cal. App. 2d 676, 24 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1962).
117 If, for instance, it be conceded that lie detectors would be accurate
on 9 out of 10 subjects, (a figure which would probably be grudgingly
granted by advocates and those opposed) and each party took the test, the
odds are that out of 81 tests there would be 1 incorrect result, 18 inconclusive
results and 72 correct results, i.e., the percentage of error would then drop
to 1.24%.
115

11 27 Ill. 2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260 (1963).

119 People v. Nicholls, 42 Ill. 2d 91, 97, 245 N.E.2d 771, 775-76 (1969);
People v. Boney, 28 Ill. 2d 505, 192 N.E.2d 920 (1963). Contra, People
ex rel. Blackmon v. Brent, 97 Ill. App. 2d 438, 240 N.E.2d 255 (1968), where
lie detector test results were admitted pursuant to a written stipulation.
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much narrower proposition and should be confined to its facts.12
While there existed in Zazzetta a stipulation, it proved to be

ineffective. Only because the stipulation was disqualified were
the test results held to be inadmissible. An invalid stipulation
should, of course, be treated as though there was no stipulation
at all. All this case indicates is that absent a stipulation, the
Illinois courts will not allow lie detector test results to be admitted.
The Zazzetta court gave four reasons for the disqualification
of the stipulation without saying which, if any, of the four

was most compelling.
The first reason given was that there was no foundation
laid as to the qualifications of the operator. Hence, it appears
that although Illinois has a statute setting forth the minimum
requirements for licensed polygraph operators, 2 ' the fact that
the act is regarded as a model act does not make it immune
to criticism.122 Meeting the requirements of the act is not
sufficient to qualify an operator to testify, and the proper foundation must be laid.' 23 In any case, even where the stipulation is
valid, the court will require that a foundation be laid as to the
qualification of the operator.
The second point disqualifying the stipulation was that it
was stipulated that the operator need not be available for cross1 24
examination. This problem first arose in State v. Bohner.

Commentators have long maintained that to admit the report
But the appellant did not object to the admission of the lie detector test until
the case was taken up on appeal. For a further discussion see text at note
79 supra.
120 "Reversal was granted on these narrow grounds and apparently limited to these specific facts"; People v. Hill, 64 Ill. App. 2d 185, 192, 212
N.E.2d 259, 262 (1965).
121 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §202-11 (1967).
The court did not even mention the existence of the statute. The statute requires that a qualified practitioner be: (1) 21 years of age; (2) a citizen of the U.S.; (3) possess the
requisite moral character; (4) never have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) pass an examination; (6) have received a college
degree; (7) have completed a six month internship. One commentator has
suggested that to insure continuity of results the state require one standard
machine, standard methods of testing and a standard method of interpretation, Note, 29 CORNELL L.Q. 535, 543-44 (1944).
The act allows those who were already practitioners to continue
122 (1)
regardless of their qualifications. (2) The requirement of a college degree
is meaningless unless the degree is in physiological or psychological fields;
Burkey, The Case Against the Polygraph, 51 A.B.A.J. 855-56 (1965).
The American Polygraphic Association requires (1) a college degree, (2)
training in an approved school, (3) 200 examinations; AMERICAN POLYGRAPHIC ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION, ART. III, §1; Prof. F. Inbau of North-

western University in 1964 estimated 80% of operators are not qualified to
interpret results; Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations ("use of Polygraphs as 'Lie Detectors" by
the Federal Government") 88 M. Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1 at 8 (1964).
123 See for example the sample foundation laid for medical experts by
2 GOLDSTEIN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE §15.21 (2d. ed. 1969). Adaptation of these
questions would appear to be simple and quite satisfactory.
124 See text at note 19 supra.
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in that case would have been a violation of the hearsay rule.1 25
But because a party can stipulate as to the non-enforcement
of a rule of evidence, 1 26 it would seem that this objection could
have been avoided had the stipulation been explicit enough. The
argument is further weakened because parties may stipulate as
12 7
to what a person, if present, would say.
Despite the correctness of these arguments on pure legal
theory, it seems unlikely, as a practical matter, that any court of
review will allow the admission of lie detector test128results where
the operator is not available to be cross-examined.

The Zazzetta court's third objection to the stipulation was
that the stipulation was oral and not written. No compelling
reason can be found for this rule, especially if the stipulation is
made in open court. However, this requirement seems to be supported by case law 129 and by Dean Wigmore 1,o and will probably
be followed.
The court then noted that the defendant appeared without
counsel prior to trial. In light of recent Supreme Court313 cases
making it mandatory that the defendant in a criminal case be
afforded the privilege of an attorney, this problem is not likely
to reappear. Several of the cases which have admitted lie detector test results have taken particular notice of the fact that
the stipulation was signed not only by the defendant but also by
his attorney. 13 2 From this it would appear that the defendant's
attorney should take part in any stipulations effected.
The last and least curable problem with which the Zazzetta
court dealt was the fact that the defendant had but an eighth
grade education and that the situation was perhaps beyond his
comprehension.'13 Perhaps this could have been cured by fully
125 See text at note 25 supra.
126 Note 64 supra.
127 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2595

(3d. ed. 1940).

Making the operator available for cross-examination would seem to
silence those who argue a lie detector cannot be cross-examined (note 4
supra) especially when it is remembered that other scientific data is admitted, the only requirement being that the operator be available for crossexamination.
129 Farmers State Sav. Bank v. Miles, 206 Ia. 766, 221 N.W. 449 (1928)
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kantrowitz,
120 N.J. Eq. 549, 188 A. 73 (1936);
contra, St. Louis , I.M. & S.Ry. v. Webster, 99 Ark. 265, 137 S.W. 1103, 1199
(1911); see Colbert v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957)
where the court said the stipulation must be written and entered in the
record, when made.
10 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2594 (3d. ed. 1940).
'3' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
132 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948) ; State
v. McNamara, 252 Ia. 19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
"'3 27 Ill. 2d 302, 309, 189 N.E.2d 260, 264 (1963).
128
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explaining to him, in layman's terms, all of the implications and
only then having him and his attorney sign. In such a case the
stipulation should properly describe whether the defendant has
been informed as to the workings of the lie detector, the type of
questions which will be asked, the manner in which deception
is detected, the fact that error exists and the possible percentage
of error.
Hence, while Zazzetta would, at first blush, appear to be a
formidable obstacle to overcome in the admission of the lie detector, it would seem that all but the possible ineptitude of the
defendant can be avoided by careful planning by counsel.
The only other Illinois case to involve the validity of a stipulation was People v. Potts. 4 The defendant, his attorney and
the State in open court agreed to have a lie detector test given
with the operator's written report being admissible.
The court struck the evidence because there was no foundation laid as to the method of testing, no foundation as to the
qualifications of the operator, and the operator was not available
for cross-examination. Hence, the evidence was excluded under
two of the most easily cured objections in Zazzetta.
Without evincing any approval or disapproval, the Potts
court quoted in toto the Valdez'3 5 qualifications. From this recognition, it appears that the Illinois courts will be amenable to
stipulated lie detector test results, but only if the Valdez qualifications are met. 136
M
T

SUMMARY

In cases where no stipulation has been effected, it seems that
the rule of Frye is still controlling. Hence, the only way in which
lie detector tests can presumably be admitted in the near future
is where there exists a properly executed stipulation.
The stipulated lie detector test results will be admissable
only after the proper foundation has been laid as to the qualifications of the operator. Unlike other areas of scientific evidence,
the stipulation goes only to admissability and has no effect on
the need to lay a proper foundation.
The operator must then be called to testify with opposing
counsel being given an opportunity for cross-examination. Ordinarily, of course, a party can stipulate as to what a witness
would say, if present. But because of judicial suspicion of the
lie detector tests, the right to confront the operator at trial will
be required.
74 Il1. App. 2d 301, 220 N.E. 251 (1966).
185 See text at note 103 supra.
186 See text at note 106 supra.
134

266

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 4:244

Case law does not indicate that any special foundation is
necessary when qualifying a lie detector operator, but this could
be a source of trouble for the unprepared attorney.
Any stipulation must be in writing. Perhaps the stipulation should be effected in open court. At any rate, the stipulation
must be properly signed, dated and witnessed to avoid judicial
repudiation.
In criminal proceedings, the stipulation must be signed by
the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney and by the defendant. Logically then, in civil cases the stipulation should be
signed by the attorneys for the parties and the parties themselves.
No one format for the stipulation would appear to fit every
factual situation. However, the stipulation should indicate
whether and to what degree the workings, accuracy and probable
jury impact of the lie detector have been described to the stipulating party. The particulars of these explanations should perhaps be explained definitively to avoid future problems, especially
where there could be some doubt as to the parties' mental capacities.
The trial court cannot compel unwilling parties to agree to a
stipulation. But, it is quite likely that in criminal cases, at least,
the state will agree to a stipulation if the offer is made in a
timely manner.
Naturally, just because one or two courts in a jurisdiction
have admitted stipulated lie detector tests, this does not mean
that either the stipulation, foundation or cross-examination requirements will be dispensed with. Hence, in each case a properly executed stipulation and a proper foundation must precede
each admission, notwithstanding prior continuous admission.
The attorney seeking to have the test results admitted must,
of course, bring to the court's attention, citations of cases in
which stipulated lie detector test results have been admitted. The
attorney seeking admission must also be prepared to show that
there are two distinct lines of cases. The first not involving stipulations; the latter involving stipulations. Counsel should be prepared to instruct the court as to recent admissibility in the latter
group of cases.
The jury should be instructed as to the weight and effect
they may give to the lie detector. Here is the area in which many
future reversals will be grounded. Two reasons appear: (1)
there have been no cases dealing with the subject, hence no judi-
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cial guidelines; (2) only properly given instructions can limit
the inherently prejudicial potential of lie detectors. The jury
should be instructed to consider the lie detector test result only
in determining whether the subject was telling the truth when
asked certain questions.
Within this framework, lie detectors may soon find widespread judicial recognition.
James R. Schirott

